We consider an innovation game in which the role of each player is well-de…ned: …rst an innovator invests, followed by a second …rm that can be an imitator or an improver. However, if we introduce legal requirements that followers have to respect (for instance patents), the role are formally reversed; innovators behave like followers since the decision of the second …rm is already (partially) …xed. We cross this observation with the fact that …rms' investment decisions can be detrimental or bene…cial to rivals and partners. For instance, the innovators can be hurt by the imitator's investment, and the imitator may bene…t from the innovator's investment, due to spillover e¤ects. In this setting, depending on the spillover e¤ects, we investigate whether innovators over or under invest when there exist local limitations to imitation and improvement of innovations.
Introduction
The innovation game is a complex dynamic process where no one can truly assert that his brandnew product or her cost-killer method comes out of nothing. All innovators bene…t from former research e¤orts, either private or public, either access-free or protected by property rights. 1 In some cases, the innovation is Pareto improving because it does not hurt the bene…ts of any incumbent and it can even be a good opportunity to improve the spectrum of services provided by some ancient products or to decrease its production and/or use cost. But in many cases, the innovation is detrimental for some agents. It can be mildly detrimental when it marginally infringes the claims of some property-right owner. In this case, the right-owner can tolerate the presence of a competing product if it is su¢ciently di¤erentiated because …ghting commercially or legally against entry would cost more than the lost revenues. The innovation can strongly hurt the bene…ts of some incumbent when it is a mere copy of the incumbent's product (and it should not be called an 'innovation'). It can even result in the exclusion of a former seller when the innovation is the drastic improvement of an ancient product or process. Because today's entrants are tomorrow's incumbents, innovators can rationally anticipate the threat of lost revenues due to entry and play strategically. For instance, an innovator who cannot bene…t from a good protection against copying has an incentive to underinvest. Symmetrically, an innovator who expects complementary discoveries that will increase his bene…ts has an incentive to overinvest. 2 This explains why the conventional framework for the economic analysis of intertemporal competition between an innovator and his potential competitors is a sequential game where the innovator decides on his e¤ort anticipating the reaction function of future entrants.
The trade-o¤ between the advantages for society of a high innovation activity and the mostly private cost of the e¤ort to innovate ineluctably pushes the government to intervene in the innovation process. The most common intervention consists in the de…nition of property rights that will allow private investors to harvest the pro…ts generated by their e¤ort rather than to share those pro…ts with free riders. For candidates to entry (either mere copiers or true 1 The 'cumulativeness' of innovations is analyzed in Scotchmer (1999) . "We are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants so that we can see more than they, and things at a greater distance not by virtue of any sharpness of sight on our part, or any physical distinction but because we are carried high and raised up by their giant size," is attributed to Bernard de Chartres, a philosopher of the 12th century.
2 O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) study a dynamic game where improvements arise randomly. They show that, if the protection against imitation is perfect whereas the protection against improvement is not, innovators tend to overinvest or underinvest, depending on the rate at which ideas occur to innovators. If ideas are too frequent, innovators cannot fully bene…t from their innovations, and thus tend to underinvest. On the other hand, if they are not that frequent, …rms tend to overinvest.
improvers), it means that they will have to step over administrative or economic thresholds in order to be accepted. For example, the novelty requirement obliges challengers to invest in 'non-imitation' much more than what they intended to do. They will not be allowed to enter if they do not di¤erentiate their product su¢ciently. The paper analyzes this problem using an elementary model of competition between two …rms when there exist spillovers between their pro…t functions.
Contrary to the patent race literature where …rms compete to be the …rst to make the same discovery (Reinganum, 1989), we consider that some …rms make innovations, whereas other …rms follow on the innovators. Consequently, these …rms do not compete for the same discoveries, and they play very di¤erent roles in the dynamic process of innovation. We thus depart from this literature as we study the investment decisions when there is no race. Our approach is closer to the 'cumulative' approach in which innovation builds upon previous discoveries (Scotchmer, 1999 , O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998). However, we do not adopt the random dynamic structure of O'Donoghue et al. (1998) . We simply assume that after an innovation has been made the follower observes it and decides how much to invest in imitation. The role of each player is well-de…ned: the leader innovates and the follower imitates, develops or improves. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that the patent protection is imperfect, as imitation is legal within certain limits. This has …rst been studied by Gallini (1992) who determines the appropriate protection against imitation as well as the optimal duration of the patent in order to prevent imitation.
However, it is not necessarily the case that entry should be prevented. If there exist positive externalities that ‡ow from the innovator (respectively the follower) to the follower (respectively the innovator), entry, even an imitation, can boost innovation rather than being detrimental.
We explore the incidence of negative and positive externalities on the investment decision of innovators and followers.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is exposed in section 2. Section 3 gives the detail of the equilibria with and without exogenous constraint in four cases. These cases correspond to the con…gurations where the innovator bene…ts or su¤ers from the competitor's investment combined with those where the competitor bene…ts or su¤ers from the innovator's investment. We thus investigate the cases where the leader becomes the follower. Section 4 focuses on the detrimental e¤ect of the IPRs on innovation. In section 5, we illustrate the four con…gurations using the Information and Communication Industry, namely the music industry, the software industry, the hardware industry and the video game industry. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Research decisions are often complex, and generally economic models represent these decisions in complicated games. If several …rms are engaged in similar research programs, they will probably race to be …rst to …nd the innovation (and to patent it). Most of the patent race models take into account both the uncertainty about the identity of the winner, and about the date at which the innovation will occur (Reinganum, 1989). Other models investigate how the externalities between the results of research will a¤ect the investment decisions of the …rms. These models consider a two-stage game where …rst …rms do research, and second they compete in quantities, as it has been initiated by D'aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
We do not consider any kind of uncertainty, and we adopt a very simple model with reduced form pro…t functions. These pro…t functions are to be viewed as the pro…t faced by the decision makers at the …rst stage of a two-stage game where the second stage equilibrium has been solved.
For instance in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), …rms …rst engage in cost-reducing R&D and then compete in quantities on a homogeneous good market. In Motta (1992) , …rst R&D is aimed at increasing the quality of products, then …rms compete on a di¤erentiated good market.
Our setting is close in spirit to the literature about knowledge externalities. However, in this literature, spillovers are in general positive externalities as they indicate the transmission of useful information. They can be included in the …nal cost reduction and be symmetric (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), asymmetric (De Bondt and Henriques, 1995), or they can intervene in each …rm's …nal R&D investment (Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992) . Most of the …ndings in these studies depend on the size of those spillovers: they can be small or large compared to a certain cut-o¤ value (that is model-dependent). Here, we do not specify where the externalities intervene, and thus we consider that spillovers can be either positive or negative.
Loosely stated what we call "negative spillovers" correspond to small spillovers in the literature, whereas "positive spillovers" would correspond to large spillovers.
We now give the detail of the game: the players, the timing of the game, the set of strategies of each player and their payo¤s. Then we explore the e¤ect of the regulation on the strategies chosen.
The players
We consider a sequential model with two …rms: an innovator (I) and a potential entrant (E).
Both have to invest in order to develop their products but E is a follower, which means that she will be second to choose, after observing the choice of I and her choice will be constrained by some
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Let us denote by x I the investment decision of I. We assume that there is no uncertainty concerning the innovation and that it is introduced and patented at the same moment. The potential entrant (or follower) observes the investment decision made by the innovator (through the innovation that has been brought about) and decides how much to invest in imitation or development. Let us denote x E this imitation or development decision. In order to keep the model as general as possible we do not precisely specify the imitation decision.
It can be a di¤erentiation decision (how far from the existing product the follower wants her product to be), an improvement decision (how better the follower wants her product compared to the initial product), or an application decision (how many applications the follower wants to introduce in the market). As we are mainly interested in the impact of the investment decision of one …rm on the decision of the other …rm, we simply consider the following reduced pro…t functions for each …rm:
where´i (i = I; E) represents a spillover e¤ect that can take positive or negative values, with
, when´I (respectivelý E ) is positive, the innovator (respectively the follower) bene…ts from the e¤ort of the other …rm. On the contrary,´I (respectively´E) negative corresponds to a negative externality borne by the innovator (respectively the follower).
The regulation
However, the follower is constrained by patent or copyright laws or speci…c regulations to respect some market boundaries. In our elementary setting these constraints will be modelled as investment requirements. If for instance the follower invests to di¤erentiate her product, the government can oblige her to invest at least a minimum level, say x E . Indeed, when he receives a patent, the innovator is being granted the right to protect a de…ned segment of the market (if we consider horizontal di¤erentiation) or a certain number of applications, or improved versions of his product (if we consider vertical di¤erentiation). Symmetrically, it can be the case that there exists some upper limit x E that the entrant is not allowed to exceed because it would be viewed as an obvious infringement of the innovator's rights. 4 Consequently, the entrant has to respect the constraints x E · x E ; and / or x E¸xE : In centrally planned systems, we would have x E = x E so that entrants would have no choice at all since all R&D decisions are controlled by one unique principal. An alternative restriction could be an exclusion zone
. This would mean that entry is accommodated only either if the challenger operates on small scale which does not deprive the innovator of large bene…ts or on the contrary if she invests large amounts of money, which could represent an improvement detrimental for the incumbent but bene…cial for consumers. The exclusion zone is the one that best corresponds to the patent system. However, in order to keep the model as simple as possible, we will only consider the two following elementary restrictions: either x E · x E or x E¸xE and we will analyze the consequences of a change in x E or x E on the investment decisions.
3 Constrained and unconstrained equilibria
Alternative equilibria
The best unconstrained choice of the follower is
since she knows x I at the time she makes her decision.
Anticipating the reaction function (3), the best choice of the innovator is
We consider three alternative cases:
1. The benchmark case in which entry is prohibited or technically impossible (either because
denote the investment in R&D made by the unchallenged monopoly. 4 When xE = 0, entry is totally forbidden. 5 There exists a cut-o¤ value x max E such that, for any x E > x max E the follower never enters as her payo¤ becomes negative.
2. The second case corresponds to constrained choices by the followers, either because
Depending on the value of the exogenous requirement, the patentholder will choose
Let b x I (x E ) be the best choice of the innovator when he anticipates dx E =dx I´0 . In particular, we have b
3. We now turn to the case where the follower observes the value of x I and can choose
x E without any restriction. She therefore reacts according to
=´E. Using this information, from (4) we can write x ¤ I as a best anticipation to x E
In the absence of binding requirement, the equilibrium levels of investment in the sequential game are
These equilibrium levels vary with the spillover parameters in a non-trivial manner. 7 The equilibrium level of investment of each …rm i, x ¤ i for i = E; I depends on its "own" spillover parameter, i.e.,´i as well as on the spillover parameter of the other …rm, i.e.,´j for j 6 = i and j = E; I. We thus investigate how each equilibrium investment varies with the two spillover e¤ects. The investment of the entrant is always increasing with´E, for any value of´I 2 (¡1; 1)
This increasing relationship does not hold any longer for the equilibrium investment of the innovator. Indeed, it increases with´I only for high values of E , i.e.,´E > ¡1=2 as @x
. For very negative values of´E, i.e., E < ¡1=2, the innovator invests less as´I increases. This is due to the sequential structure of our game. 6 Solving (3) and (4) gives the same result as solving the system of equations (3) and (7). We use the latter method which has the advantage to allow a direct graphical comparison of the investment levels when the game is sequential and when the game is simultaneous. The same kind of trick can be used to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium where a leader and a follower compete in quantities to sell an homogenous product. 7 Amir et alii (2001) show that the equilibrium R&D level is decreasing in the spillover parameter but, in their model, the parameter is de…ned at the production stage as information sharing to decrease costs while in our model the spillover parameters are shortcuts for all the interactions between …rms at all stages.
We now investigate how the equilibrium levels of investment change after a change in the other spillover parameter. The investment of the entrant increases with´I either for small values of´E < ¡1=2 or for positive values of´E, as @x ¤ E =@´I =´E(1 + 2´E)=(1 ¡ 2´E´I ) 2 . For values of´E 2 (¡1=2; 0), the equilibrium level of investment of the entrant decreases with´I . Finally, the equilibrium investment of the innovator is increasing (respectively decreasing) with´E if
It is clear that the comparison of the optimal investments of the innovator given by (5), (6) , and (8) depends on the sign of the spillover parameters´E and´I .
IPRs induces the leader to behave like a follower
Interestingly, even though the roles of each player are well-determined at the beginning of the game (who is the leader, who is the follower), the imposition of IPRs induces the leader to behave like a follower.
Let consider the case where the follower bene…ts from the research of the innovator (´E > 0) but the presence of the imitator is harmful to the innovator (´I < 0). This case corresponds to the traditional model of imitation, where imitation (respectively innovation) creates a negative (respectively positive) externality on the innovator's pro…t (respectively the imitator's pro…t).
Because´I < 0, when facing the threat of imitation we can see in Figure 1 that the innovator has a natural incentive to invest less than when there is no such threat (x ¤ I < x m I ). But this is the unconstrained equilibrium of the sequential game. As an innovator, …rm I is protected against too large (x E · x E ) or too small investment (x E¸x E ) of the challenger. Do these limits help the innovator to keep a high level of investment?
The requirement to invest at least x E is binding only when x E > x ¤ E : It has an adverse e¤ect on the innovator's pro…t who is obliged to increase his R&D investment (b x I (x E ) > x ¤ I ) at least as long as x E is not too large. For a very large requirement x E ; the e¤ort of the incumbent is less than x ¤ I . Actually, as can be seen in …gure 1 and …gure 2, when x E¸xE is imposed, the R&D expenditure of the innovator expressed as a function of x E is discontinuous at point
E . This is because imposing such a constraint is like changing the timing of the game. The regulated value of the follower expenditure x E is …xed before the innovator expenditure x I . 
but not too high). So, from the innovator's viewpoint, a very tough IPRs policy induces more innovation by preventing imitation. However, any IPRs policy that permits entry (restricted or not, but that does not completely deter entry) allows to increase the total sum of the investments made by …rms. Thus, from a strict society's viewpoint, it is not clear whether a very tough policy that completely prevents entry is better than a softer requirement that allows to speed up imitation, or eventually improvement. We need to carefully study how the imposition of IPRs a¤ect all the investments.
Detrimental e¤ect of IPRs on innovation
Thus, we now investigate what are the e¤ects of the IPRs on the investment decisions of the two …rms. From a social viewpoint, not only the investment made by the initial innovator matters, but how much investment is made overall is of interest as well. We …nd that because the spillover e¤ects can be either positive or negative, the overall investment (x I + x E ) can be reduced when IPRs are in force.
It is straightforward to derive the sum of the investments in the unconstrained case and constrained case. When there is no constraint on the follower, the sum is
When the IPRs are in force, the follower is constraint to invest x E (either x E or x E ), the sum of the investments becomes
Whatever the value of´I , this is an increasing function of the legal cuto¤ value imposed by the government. Finally, if the constraint is too strong (either x E = 0 or x E > x max E ), the relevant investment is the monopoly investment of the leader x m I = 1. Furthermore, there exists a value e x E such that
We represent all these functions in …gure 4. Let now consider di¤erent scenarios depending on whether the investment of the follower,
x ¤ E , is smaller of higher than the cuto¤ value e x E .
Case 1.
Consider that the optimal investment of the follower is smaller than the cuto¤ value,
i.e., x ¤ E < e x E . This inequality holds if ¡´E´I < 0 which arises either when´E > 0 and´I > 0 or when´E < 0 and´I < 0. Thus, we have two di¤erent con…gurations of the parameters for which x ¤ E < e x E . We now investigate whether strong or weak IPRs are detrimental to innovation when we consider that the IPRs policy imposes either a minimum or a maximum threshold that the follower must respect.
² If the policy imposes a minimum threshold (x E ), and if the regulation is strong enough, i.e., x E > x ¤ E , the constraint is binding and the follower must invest x E . Thus, under a policy such that x E < e x E , IPRs are detrimental to innovation as the sum of the investments with IPRs is lower than the sum in absence of any policy
the converse is true, and IPRs boost innovation. This is no longer the case for x E > x max E , in which case the policy is so strict that the follower does not enter, and the leader is a monopoly.
² If the policy imposes a maximum threshold (x E ), and if x E < x ¤ E , the constraint is binding, and the follower must spend x E . For any policy, IPRs are detrimental to innovation. Indeed, the sum of the investments with IPRs is always lower than the sum without IPRs (b
Case 2. We now consider that x ¤ E > e x E . This inequality holds if ¡´E´I > 0, meaning either when´E > 0 and´I < 0 or when´E < 0 and´I > 0.
² If the policy imposes a minimum threshold (x E ), and if the regulation is strong enough, i.e., x E > x ¤ E , the constraint is binding and the follower must invest x E . Under a policy x E < x max E , IPRs are not detrimental. However, if x E¸x max E , IPRs are detrimental to innovation as x m I < x ¤ I + x ¤ E . ² If the policy imposes a maximum threshold, and if x E < x ¤ E , the constraint is binding. For any policy such that x E < e x E , IPRs are detrimental to innovation. Otherwise, if
x E > e x E , the is no longer the case.
Overall, the imposition of a ceiling investment (x E ) is in general detrimental to society as it often induces the sum of the investments to be reduced. However, this is not the case if the policy x E is close to x ¤ E . On the other hand, the imposition of a ‡oor investment (x E ) is in general bene…cial to society, especially when the IPRs are tough enough (x E high enough but smaller than x max E ). For more lenient policy, (i.e., x E close to x ¤ E ), it can be detrimental.
Industry-speci…c Externalities
We now detail four con…gurations that we classify according to the relevance of both signs for a speci…c branch of the ICT industry. For instance,´E > 0 and´I > 0 corresponds to an industry where both externalities are positive: the more the innovator (respectively the follower) invests, the higher the pro…t of the follower (respectively the innovator). This corresponds to the externalities that arise in the computer industry where I stands for the microprocessor producers and E represents the software developers. They both bene…t from the e¤ort of the other.
In this section we consider the innovation game in the industry of ICTs. We successively consider the four cases where´E and´I can be both positive, or both negative or can have opposite signs.
The Music Industry
The music industry is a good illustration of the situation where´E > 0 and´I < 0 (see …gures 1 to 3). At the beginning of 2000, Napster developed a program to download MP3 …les. In less than six months the music industry i) incurred losses evaluated at $ 20m and ii) sued Napster at law to obtain the withdrawal of the program needed for downloading. Music companies argued that given the copy (imitation) activity encouraged by Napster-like …rms, their expenditures in new talents research and recording activity would drop dramatically (say from x m I to x ¤ I ). The demand for withdrawal and the decision taken by courts in 2001 consist in the tentative to go back to x m I . Napster has now disappeared but it has been replaced by many newcomers. 8 From the …gures, we see that if the public objective is to keep the e¤ort of I as high as possible, the best policy is to …x x E = 0:
An innovation can also be severely damaged by dramatic improvements. All the history of the software industry is made of …rst movers excluded from the market by a drastically improved version of their product: Word, Excel, Explorer and Outlook have replaced respectively WordPerfect, Lotus 1-2-3, Netscape and Eudora as dominant applications. 9 This extreme case is illustrated by the case where´I is close to ¡1. From (8) and (9) we see that this results in the bankruptcy of the innovator (x ¤ I ! 0) and its replacement by the follower (x ¤ E ! 1 = x m E ). In this case, it would be ine¢cient to protect I.
The Software Industry
We now consider the case where the innovator bene…ts from the research of the follower, and, reciprocally, the follower bene…ts from the e¤orts of the innovator (´E > 0 and´I > 0). Following the 'conventional' de…nition of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) , the investment decisions of the …rms are strategic complements.
If the follower is allowed to freely enter the market the investment made by the innovator is non-ambiguously higher than the investment of the innovator when he is not threatened by any imitator: we see from …gure 5 that x ¤ I > x m I . In this case the expected presence of the follower boosts innovation: the innovator has high incentives to invest more since he will later bene…t from the e¤orts of the follower.
Now if x ¤
E < x E , we also have x I (x E ) > x m I by transitivity. 10 But x I (x E ) can be larger or smaller than x ¤ I depending on the slopes of b x I (x E ) and x I (x E ) and on the value of x E . If the minimum investment requirement x E is larger than but close to x ¤ E , we see that the R&D expenditure of the innovator is lower than without the x E requirement.
Because of the discontinuity in the innovator's investment created by the legal restriction imposed to the follower (x E¸xE or x E · x E ) if the government wants to foster R&D e¤orts by imposing a minimal constraint on followers, this constraint is to be very stringent, namely 8 See www.afternapster.com. 9 The idea that the four Microsoft's products are technically better than their predecessors is developed in Leibowitz and Margolis (2001). Some authors challenge this idea and consider that Microsoft won the battle by its marketing policy (mainly forced bundling) rather than on technical grounds; see Gilbert and Katz (2001) . 10 As xI(xE ) is an increasing function. The reader can easily draw the graphs of xI (x E ) and xI(xE ) corresponding to …gure 5 like we did with …gures 2 and 3 that correspond to …gure 1.
1¡2´E´I . Clearly, a maximum requirement x E · x E would not be a good idea either since the e¤ort of I is increasing with x E . At most, the innovator will invest x ¤ I . At worst (when x E < x ¤ E ), he will invest b x I (x E ) < x ¤ I : A very tough IPRs policy has a negative impact on investments as a monopoly always invests less than competitive …rms. In this case it is clear that competition boosts innovation.
Furthermore, the total sum of investments is always higher under IPRs policies that allow entry. This parameter con…guration can be observed in the software industry where developers of operating systems (OS) bene…t from the expenditures of applications' publishers (´I > 0) and symmetrically, the applications' publishers bene…t from the …nancial e¤ort of the OS developers (´E > 0). Consequently if we just want to increase the OS research expenditure, it is better not to impose any minimum constraint on the e¤ort of the applications' publishers if it is a mild constraint. Indeed a constraint x E¸xE where x E is slightly above x ¤ E would have the adverse e¤ect of decreasing x I . Alternative solutions to increase x I are to encourage joint venture and to organize a merger between the OS and application producers. But the simplest obvious policy is to leave this type of industry without any restriction to the entrant's decisions.
The Hardware Industry
Consider now that the follower does not bene…t from the innovator (´E < 0) while the latter bene…ts from the entrant's e¤ort (´I > 0). Because of the negative externality they su¤er from the innovator (´E < 0), the follower is somewhat reluctant to invest. By contrast, the innovator would like her to increase her research e¤ort. A minimal requirement x E¸xE above x ¤ E is a good incentive to develop the innovator's e¤ort since b
x I (x E ) > x m I for all x E > x ¤ E : An IPRs policy that prevents entry induces the innovator to invest more only if the negative externality of the follower is very large (i.e.,´E < ¡0:5). Otherwise, competition tends to boost innovation. For any value of the spillovers, the total sum of investment is always higher under competition than if it prohibited. However, a policy that restricts entry (i.e., x E > x ¤ E ) allows to increase the investment of the innovator as well as the total sum of the investments.
In industries with strong network externalities, innovators bene…t from a large users base.
They face a trade-o¤ to let imitators enter. On one hand, they bene…t from additional users but, on the other hand, they lose in unit sales. A good example is the hardware industry where innovators (brand …rms) may have advantage in letting "clones" be in the market. For instance Sun Microsystem, has encouraged clones of its computer workstation to build its technology's user base (Conner (1995) ). Those consumers who favour higher quality, have a preference for the branded hardware. As the innovator invests in providing cheaper computer workstations, the demand for clones decreases and thus it hurts the imitator (´E < 0). On the other hand, the introduction of clones allows the user base to grow, so the innovator gains from letting the imitator be in the market (´I > 0). Thus imitation boosts innovation. It is even more dramatic if the imitation is restricted: the innovator invests more than without the minimum or maximum requirement imposed to the imitator.
The Video Game Industry
In many industries, the follower su¤ers from the innovator (´E < 0) and the latter su¤ers from the former (´I < 0). In this case, the investment decisions of the two …rms are strategic substitutes. a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
-
Research e¤orts in the video-game industry (´E < 0;´I < 0)
As compared with the case where the innovator does not su¤er from any imitation (´I = 0
and thus x ¤ I = x m I ), when´I < 0 we see that the presence of the imitator has the e¤ect to increase (respectively decrease the innovator's e¤ort) as´E < ¡1=2 (respectively´E > ¡1=2).
Once more, the introduction of a minimum requirement on x E has the e¤ect to create a downward jump in x I at point x ¤ E . But contrary to the former case, an additional increase in x E provokes a decrease in x I (x E ). Therefore, to …x a minimal threshold for the investment by imitators is always detrimental for the e¤orts of the innovator.
When´E is very small (´E < ¡1=2), the innovator is inclined to overinvesting (x ¤ I > x m I ) because she knows that this is armful to imitators who will invest less. Consequently, if the government …xes x E > x ¤ E , this dissuasive policy does not work any longer. On the contrary, we observe that x I (x E ) is less than x m I for x E > x ¤ E . The requirement x E that can be viewed as the investment that measures the novelty of an improvement on the initial innovation provides a negative incentive to innovate. The higher x E , the lower is the incentive to spend money on the initial innovation: x E is like a barrier that protects the innovator.
Thus, a tough IPRs policy allows the innovator to invest more only if the follower's negative externality is very strong (´E < ¡1=2). When entry is just restricted, the innovator does not invest more. Here again competition induces …rms to invest more compared to what a monopoly would do.
In industries where the leader and the follower have di¤erent standards, the more the leader invests in an innovation that promotes his standards, the less the follower bene…ts from it (´E < 0). On the other hand, the more the follower invests in an innovation that is compatible with her own standard, the lower the pro…t of the leader (´I < 0). Innovators invest more in presence of competitors. The competition between Nintendo and Sega is relevant for this speci…c case. Indeed, every time Nintendo invents a new game, Sega loses consumers. Then Sega invests to produce a similar-kind of game that will be detrimental to Nintendo. 11 If the government intervenes and forces Sega to arti…cially di¤erentiate its product for instance, it will reduce innovations, instead of boosting them. In fact each …rm will compete in di¤erent markets.
The present …ght for digital dominance between Microsoft and Nokia in the mobile phones market is another illustration of this case of technological competition. 12 
Conclusion
In the innovation game, each player in his turn appears as the leader. 13 The strategies are so intricate that the game is a complex combination of simultaneous, sequential and collusive 11 Concerning the study of standards as well as the competition between Nintendo and Sega, see Shapiro and Varian (1999) . 12 See The Economist, November 21, 2002. into activities more pro…table than cable TV broadcasting and to propose services that satellite rivals cannot match, namely broadband internet access, interactive television and national cable-telephone. 14 The spillover e¤ect at work in the former sections can have several origins and di¤erent materializations: technological, legal, marketing. 15 Like in many other sequential decision processes, the participants to the innovation game su¤er sort of intertemporal schizophrenia. When they are candidates to entry they would like to face doors wide open. Later, the winners of the race will argue that doors should be kept tightly closed. Let us remain within our model where the decision variables are investment in R&D, not legal arrangements that are exogenous. Because of the aforementioned evolution of the players' interests a complete description of the innovation game should require that entrants internalize their expected behavior as future incumbent.
One case where the net value of the spillover coe¢cients of each …rm (taking into account all the positive and negative externalities resulting from technological constraints and market conditions) is most likely positive is when …rms have to decide on an industry-wide standard.
For example, since 1999, hundreds of …rms in the telecom industry support Voice XML (for Voice eXtensible Mark-up Language) as a common language for all the voice applications.
14 Additionally, "Comcast has a foot in the content business through the QVC home shopping channel, its Hello!-style entertainment channel, E!, and the Golf Channel. Its latest project is G4, a channel for video games. With its enlarged customer base, Comcast will become a powerful partner for those looking to launch new services. 'The beauty of having 21.5m customers is for ourselves or other companies or entrepreneurs to enable their business plans,' Mr Robert (the Comcast's president) says." From the Financial Times, December 20, 2002. 15 In d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), knowledge spills over after the end of the R&D process, i.e., spillover relates to R&D outputs. By contrast, in Kamien et al. (1992) knowledge spills over during the R&D process, i.e., spillover relates to R&D inputs. In our model, we cannot distinguish between the two types of spillover.
Nowadays, when we want to obtain tra¢c information or to check bank accounts by phone without the intervention of a live operator, we are limited to pushing some buttons or using a prede…ned vocabulary. These ‡aws obviously impair the pro…tability of this type of activity. To develop it necessitates drastic progress in speech recognition. This is the objective of the Voice XML, pushed by the main …rms of the telecom industry within World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), an Internet standards body. 16 The industry members all expect lower costs (saving on live operators) and higher demand (due to easier and more rapid information). 16 See the Economist, December 14, 2002, p. 28-29. In the past, W3C developed HTML (for Hypertext Mark-up Language) used to design web pages.
